A Formal Analysis of IEEE 802.11's WPA2: Models and Proofs
This website provides a formal model of IEEE 802.11's WPA2 protocol together with proofs of several security properties. Details of the formal model are discussed in the corresponding paper A Formal Analysis of IEEE 802.11's WPA2: Countering the Kracks Caused by Cracking the Counters (USENIX '20). The model is created for the theorem prover Tamarin. All files related to the model are contained in a zip archive that can be downloaded via the following link:
Prerequisites
To produce our formal model, we used the Tamarin prover (version 1.4.1). Installation instructions for Tamarin can be found here. You need Tamarin to inspect the model, run proofs, and verify existing proofs. Note that Tamarin runs on Linux and Mac, but not on Windows. If you plan to use or edit the model, you also need the GNU M4 macro processor.
Files of the Formal Model
The main file, containing the formal model of WPA2 together with all lemmas, is the file model/wpa2_four_way_handshake.m4. This file needs to be preprocessed with the GNU M4 macro processor to turn it into valid input for Tamarin (see below for details).
If you don't want to use M4 and are only interested in the resulting Tamarin files, then the following two files will be enough for you (note that although these files can be read by Tamarin, the original M4 file is more readable):

model/wpa2_four_way_handshake_patched.spthy  A formal model of WPA2 including patches/countermeasures aimed at avoiding keyreinstallation attacks.

model/wpa2_four_way_handshake_unpatched.spthy  A formal model of WPA2 without the patches/countermeasures.
The first file is obtained from wpa2_four_way_handshake.m4 by running the following command:
m4 wpa2_four_way_handshake.m4 > wpa2_four_way_handshake_patched.spthy
The second file is obtained from wpa2_four_way_handshake.m4 by setting the M4 macro INCLUDE_PATCHES
to false in the file wpa2_four_way_handshake.m4 (line 7) and then running:
m4 wpa2_four_way_handshake.m4 > wpa2_four_way_handshake_unpatched.spthy
Note that the formal model of the WPA2 encryption layer (discussed in our paper) is specified in the file model/encryption_layer.m4i, which is included by model/wpa2_four_way_handshake.m4.
Overview of the Model
The model file wpa2_four_way_handshake.m4 consists of the following parts (in the same order as presented here):

Several definitions of constants/macros as well as definitions of function symbols and an equation defining noncebased encryption/decryption.

Restrictions (starting at line 36) that handle (1) Checks for equality and inequality (used, e.g., for modeling the verification of message integrity codes), (2) a FIFO restriction for the message queue, which is part of the encryption layer, (3) the replaycounter mechanisms (on the receiver side) and (4) restrictions for modeling memory allocation. Note that (in contrast to the illustrative example in Section 2 of our paper), replay counters on the sender side are not modeled/restricted with restrictions.

Setup/Creation of supplicants and authenticators as well as a rule for associating authenticator threads with supplicant threads (starting at line 126).

The encryption layer (mostly defined in the file model/encryption_layer.m4i) as well as rules for modeling nonce reuse and key compromise (starting at line 190).

The authenticator state machine for the fourway handshake (starting at line 283) followed by the supplicant state machine for the fourway handshake (starting at line 476)

The groupkey handshake state machines for the supplicant (starting at line 686) and for the authenticator (starting at line 730)

The state machines for the communication related to WNM sleep mode, starting with the part for the authenticator (from line 890), followed by the part for the supplicant (from line 955).
The rest of the file then contains all lemmas, followed by existential statements that serve as plausibility checks. The final lemma (krack_attack_ptk at line 1801) is an existential statement for the KRACK attack on the fourway handshake (see below).
Proof Files
The proofs of all lemmas (in the patched model) are contained in the folders automatic_proofs (contains the automatically generated proofs) and manual_proofs (contains the manually produced proofs). Each proof file is named after the lemma it proves, with the suffix '.spthy'. For example, the proof of lemma 'authenticator_ptk_is_secret' is in the file automatic_proofs/authenticator_ptk_is_secret.spthy.
Each proof file contains the whole formal model as well as all the lemmas. Only the lemma for which a proof was generated also has a corresponding proof in the file (for the other lemmas, no proof is in the file).
Inspecting Proofs with Tamarin
To inspect proofs, you can use the socalled interactive mode of the Tamarin prover. The interactive mode can be started as follows:

Call the command
tamarinprover interactive .
from within a directory of your choice (we recommend to start interactive mode in a folder different from automatic_proofs, because otherwise Tamarin runs on all the files in this folder, which could take very long). 
Start the Firefox browser and open the URL http://localhost:3001.

Load a proof file by clicking Browse... and choosing one of the proof files. Once you've chosen a file, click Load new theory:
 The proof file should now show up in the list of lemmas (see below). By clicking on the theory name for a given file, you can open the file. Note that this can take a while for larger proofs:
 Once a proof file has been loaded successfully, the list of lemmas is shown on the left of the page. Scroll to the corresponding lemma to see its proof. If a proof is colored green and ends with qed, it means that Tamarin could successfully check the correctness of the proof:
Generating the Proofs
If you want to generate the proofs for the lemmas of our formal model (except for the ones we proved manually), you can proceed as follows:

Open a terminal and go to the root directory of the archive.

Execute the script ./proof_generation/generate_proofs.sh (Command:
./proof_generation/generate_proofs.sh
). Note that it is important to call this script from the root directory and not from some other directory. 
The proofs for the lemmas will now be generated. The status of each lemma is printed to the terminal. Overall, this should take around one hour on a machine with 16 GB of memory. Our script calls Tamarin via the tool UT Tamarin; UT Tamarin is a wrapper for Tamarin that allows the convenient generation of multiple proofs. Note that UT Tamarin is compiled on the spot, which requires CMake, GNU Make, and the g++ compiler (Version 7.5 or newer). Moreover, UT Tamarin requires an installed version of Tamarin as well as of the GNU M4 macro processor.
When the script is finished, all automatically generated proofs can be found in the directory ./automatic_proofs.
KRACK Attack
The folder traces contains a Tamarin file with an attack trace for a KRACK attack on the WPA2 fourway handshake (in the file krack_attack_ptk.spthy). The attack is on the unpatched model, i.e., the version of the model that does not contain the countermeasures aimed at preventing keyreinstallation attacks. A corresponding picture (produced by Tamarin) showing the attack trace is also contained in the folder: krack_attack_ptk.png.
In the picture of the trace, the authenticator is colored purple whereas the supplicant is colored blue. Notice how the rule Supp_Install_Key_Snd_M4 occurs twice, leading to the reinstallation of the PTK KDF(<~PMK, ~ANonce, ~SNonce>)
. This resets the corresponding nonce. Since the supplicant sends two different messages (yellow rule sendPTKEncryptedPayloadSupp) with the same key and the same nonce, this allows the attacker to learn the PTK with the (red) rule KeyRevealFromNonceReuse.